

**English Researches:**

- **Dr. Bandar Jaber Dawshi** - *University of Southern Mississippi*  
How did ISIS use Social Media to Spread its Extremist Ideas?: An Analytical Study 7

**Abstracts of Arabic Researches:**

- **Prof. Dr. Abdullah Khamis Al-Kindi** - *Sultan Qaboos University*  
**Dr. Faten Ben Lagha** - *Sultan Qaboos University*  
**Azza Al-Yaroubi** - *Sultan Qaboos University*  
The Impact of Personal, Professional, and Social Factors on Occupational Burnout Among Public Relations Practitioners in the Sultanate of Oman 35
- **Prof. Dr. Azza Mostafa Elkahkey** - *Umm Al-Qura University*  
**Naseem Muhammad Mahmoud Al-Sharif** - *Umm Al-Qura University*  
The Role of Media Education for Pre-University Education Students in Achieving the Concept of a Knowledge Society According to the Kingdom's Vision 2030: A Study on a Sample of the Academic Elite in the Fields of Media and Education 36
- **Dr. Mahmoud Mohamed Mostafa Khallouf** - *Arab American University*  
**Deema Hussein Shehade Assaf** - *Arab American University*  
The Nature of the Treatments of the "Arab American" and "Khadouri" Universities Websites before and during the Corona Pandemic 38
- **Dr. Fatimah Fayez Qotob** - *Beni Suef University*  
**Dr. Ahmed Shehata Abd El Fadeel Ebaed** - *Beni Suef University*  
Reality of Service Content Forms in Egyptian Digital Platforms: An Evaluative Study 39
- **Dr. Howaida Mohamed Lotfy Ahmed** - *Umm Al-Qura University*  
**Nadrah. S. Bahamdan** - *Umm Al-Qura University*  
Consciousness of University Saudi Youth for the Potential Risks of Electronic Marketing of Pharmaceutical Products: Empirical Study 40
- **Dr. Souad Mohammed Mustafa Mohammed** - *Aljazeera Institute for Media and Mass Communication*  
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Public Relations Departments in Public and Private Health Organizations (Hospitals) in the Face of the COVID-19 Pandemic 41
- **Dr. Rola Abdel Rahman Saqr** - *Misr University for Science and Technology*  
The Role of Social Media sites in Educating the Egyptian Public about the Nile Water Crisis 42

(ISSN 2314-8721)

Egyptian National Scientific &amp; Technical Information Network (ENSTINET)

With the permission of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation in Egypt

Deposit Number: 24380 /2019



Copyright 2022@APRA

www.jprr.epra.org.eg



## Founder & Chairman

### Dr. Hatem Moh'd Atef

EPRA Chairman

## Editor in Chief

### Prof. Dr. Aly Agwa

Professor of Public Relations & former Dean of Faculty  
of Mass Communication - Cairo University  
Head of the Scientific Committee of EPRA

## Editorial Manager

### Prof. Dr. Mohamed Moawad

Media Professor at Ain Shams University & former Dean of  
Faculty of Mass Communication - Sinai University  
Head of the Consulting Committee of EPRA

## Editorial Assistants

### Prof. Dr. Rizk Abd Elmoaty

Professor of Public Relations  
Misr International University

### Prof. Dr. Mohamed Alamry (Iraq)

Professor & Head of Public Relations Dep.  
Mass Communication Faculty  
Baghdad University

### Dr. Thouraya Snoussi (Tunisia)

Associate professor of Mass Communication &  
Coordinator College of Communication  
University of Sharjah (UAE)

### Dr. Fouad Ali Saddam (Yemen)

Associate Professor & Head Dep. of Public Relations  
Faculty of Mass Communication  
Yarmouk University (Jordan)

### Dr. Nasr Elden Othman (Sudan)

Assistant Professor of Public Relations  
Faculty of Mass Communication & Humanities Sciences  
Ajman University (UAE)

## Public Relations Manager

### Alsaeid Salm

## Arabic Reviewers

### Ali Elmehy

### Sayid Sherif

## Address

### Egyptian Public Relations Association

Arab Republic of Egypt

Giza - Dokki - Ben Elsarayat - 1 Mohamed Alzoghpy Street

### Publications: Al Arabia Public Relations Agency

Arab Republic of Egypt

Menofia - Shibeh El-Kom - Postal Code: 32111 - P.O Box: 66

Mobile: +201141514157

Fax: +20482310073

Tel: +2237620818

www.jprr.epra.org.eg

Email: jprr@epra.org.eg - ceo@apr.agency

## Advisory Board \*\*

### JPRR.ME

### Prof. Dr. Aly Agwa (Egypt)

Professor of Public Relations and former Dean of the Faculty of Mass Communication, Cairo University

### Prof. Dr. Thomas A. Bauer (Austria)

Professor of Mass Communication at the University of Vienna

### Prof. Dr. Yas Elbaiaty (Iraq)

Professor of Journalism at the University of Baghdad, Vice Dean of the Faculty of Media and Information  
and Humanities, Ajman University of Science

### Prof. Dr. Mohamed Moawad (Egypt)

Media professor at Ain Shams University & former Dean of Faculty of Mass Communication - Sinai  
University

### Prof. Dr. Abd Elrahman El Aned (KSA)

Professor of Media and Public Relations Department of the Faculty of Media Arts - King Saud University

### Prof. Dr. Mahmoud Yousef (Egypt)

Professor of Public Relations - Faculty of Mass Communication, Cairo University

### Prof. Dr. Samy Taya (Egypt)

Professor and Head of Public Relations Faculty of Mass Communication - Cairo University

### Prof. Dr. Gamal Abdel-Hai Al-Najjar (Egypt)

Professor of Media, Faculty of Islamic Studies for Girls, Al-Azhar University

### Prof. Dr. Sherif Darwesh Allaban (Egypt)

Professor of printing press & Vice- Dean for Community Service at the Faculty of Mass  
Communication, Cairo University

### Prof. Dr. Othman Al Arabi (KSA)

Professor of Public Relations and the former head of the media department at the Faculty of Arts – King  
Saud University

### Prof. Dr. Abden Alsharef (Libya)

Media professor and dean of the College of Arts and Humanities at the University of Zaytuna – Libya

### Prof. Dr. Waled Fathalha Barakat (Egypt)

Professor of Radio & Television and Vice- Dean for Student Affairs at the Faculty of Mass  
Communication, Cairo University

### Prof. Dr. Tahseen Mansour (Jordan)

Professor of Public Relations & Dean the Faculty of Mass Communication, Yarmouk  
University

### Prof. Dr. Ali Kessaissia, (Algeria)

Professor, Faculty of Media Science & Communication, University of Algiers-3.

### Prof. Dr. Redouane BoudJema, (Algeria)

Professor, Faculty of Media Science & Communication, University of Algiers-3.

### Prof. Dr. Hisham Mohammed Zakariya, (Sudan)

Professor of Mass Communication at King Faisal University – Former Dean of the Faculty of Community  
Development at the University of the Nile Valley, Sudan.

### Prof. Dr. Abdul Malek Radman Al-Danani, (Yemen)

Professor, Faculty of Media & Public Relations, Emirates Collage of Technology, UAE.

\*\* Names are arranged according to the date of obtaining the degree of a university professor.

# **Journal of Public Relations Research Middle East**

**I**t is a scientific journal that publishes specialized research papers in Public Relations, Mass Media and Communication ,after peer refereeing these papers by a number of Professors specialized in the same field under a scientific supervision of the Egyptian Public Relations Association, which considered the first Egyptian scientific association specialized in public relations, (Member of the network of scientific Associations in the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology in Cairo).

The Journal is part of Al-Arabia Public Relations Agency's publications, specialized in education, scientific consultancy and training.

- The Journal is approved by the Supreme Council for Media Regulation in Egypt. It has an international numbering and a deposit number. It is classified internationally for its both printed and electronic versions by the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology in Cairo. In addition, it is classified by the Scientific Promotions Committee in the field of Media of the Supreme Council of Universities in Egypt.
- It is the first arbitrate scientific journal with this field of specialization on the Arab world and the Middle East. Also, the first Arab scientific journal in the specialty of (media) which obtained the Arab Impact Factor with a factor of  $2.01 = 100\%$  in the year of 2020G report of the American Foundation NSP "Natural Sciences Publishing" Sponsored by the Arab Universities Union.
- This journal is published quarterly.
- The journal accepts publishing books, conferences, workshops and scientific Arab and international events.
- The journal publishes advertisements on scientific search engines, Arabic and foreign publishing houses according to the special conditions adhered to by the advertiser.
- It also publishes special research papers of the scientific promotion and for researchers who are about to defend master and Doctoral theses.
- The publication of academic theses that have been discussed, scientific books specialized in public relations and media and teaching staff members specialized scientific essays.

## **Publishing rules:**

- It should be an original Manuscripts that has never been published.
- Arabic, English, French Manuscripts are accepted however a one-page abstract in English should be submitted if the Manuscripts is written in Arabic.
- The submitted Manuscripts should be in the fields of public relations and integrated marketing communications.
- The submitted scientific Manuscripts are subject to refereeing unless they have been evaluated by scientific committees and boards at recognized authorities or they were part of an accepted academic thesis.
- The correct scientific bases of writing scientific research should be considered. It should be typed, in Simplified Arabic in Arabic Papers, 14 points font for the main text. The main and sub titles, in Bold letters. English Manuscripts should be written in Times New Roman.
- References are mentioned at the end of the Manuscripts in a sequential manner.

- References are monitored at the end of research, according to the methodology of scientific sequential manner and in accordance with the reference signal to the board in a way that APA Search of America.
- The author should send an electronic copy of his manuscript by Email written in Word format with his/her CV.
- In case of accepting the publication of the manuscript in the journal, the author will be informed officially by a letter. But in case of refusing, the author will be informed officially by a letter and part of the research publication fees will be sent back to him soon.
- If the manuscript required simple modifications, the author should resent the manuscript with the new modifications during one week after the receipt the modification notes, and if the author is late, the manuscript will be delayed to the upcoming issue, but if there are thorough modifications in the manuscript, the author should send them after 15 days.
- The publication fees of the manuscript for the Egyptians are: 2800 L.E. and for the Expatriate Egyptians and the Foreigners are: 550 \$. with 25% discount for Masters and PhD Students.
- If the referring committee refused and approved the disqualification of publishing the manuscript, an amount of 1400 L.E. will be reimbursed for the Egyptian authors and 275 \$ for the Expatriate Egyptians and the Foreigners.
- Fees are not returned if the researcher retracts and withdraws the research from the journal for arbitration and publishing it in another journal.
- The manuscript does not exceed 40 pages of A4 size. 30 L.E. will be paid for an extra page for the Egyptians and 10 \$ for Expatriate Egyptians and the Foreigners authors.
- A special 25 % discount of the publication fees will be offered to the Egyptians and the Foreign members of the Fellowship of the Egyptian Public Relations Association for any number of times during the year.
- Two copies of the journal and Five Extracted pieces from the author's manuscript after the publication.
- The fees of publishing the scientific abstract of (Master's Degree) are: 500 L.E. for the Egyptians and 150 \$ for the Foreigners.
- The fees of publishing the scientific abstract of (Doctorate Degree) are: 600 L.E. for the Egyptians and 180 \$ for the Foreigners. As the abstract do not exceed 8 pages and a 10 % discount is offered to the members of the Egyptian Public Relations Association. One copy of the journal will be sent to the author's address.
- Publishing a book offer costs LE 700 for the Egyptians and 300 \$US for foreigners.
- One copy of the journal is sent to the author of the book after the publication to his/her address. And a 10% discount is offered to the members of the Egyptian Public Relations Association.
- For publishing offers of workshops organization and seminars, inside Egypt LE 600 and outside Egypt U.S. \$ 350 without a limit to the number of pages.
- The fees of the presentation of the International Conferences inside Egypt: 850 L.E. and outside Egypt: 450 \$ without a limitation of the number of pages.
- All the research results and opinions express the opinions of the authors of the presented research papers not the opinions of the Al-Arabia Public Relations Agency or the Egyptian Public Relations Association.
- Submissions will be sent to the chairman of the Journal.

### **Address:**

Al Arabia Public Relations Agency,

Arab Republic of Egypt, Menofia, Shibben El-Kom, Crossing Sabry Abo Alam st. & Al- Amin st.

Postal Code: 32111 - P.O Box: 66

And also, to the Journal email: [jpr@epra.org.eg](mailto:jpr@epra.org.eg), or [ceo@apr.agency](mailto:ceo@apr.agency), after paying the publishing fees and sending a copy of the receipt.

All rights reserved.

None of the materials provided on this Journal or the web site may be used, reproduced or transmitted, in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or the use of any information storage and retrieval system, except as provided for in the Terms and Conditions of use of Al Arabia Public Relations Agency, without permission in writing from the publisher.

And all applicable terms and conditions and international laws with regard to the violation of the copyrights of the electronic or printed copy.

ISSN for the printed copy

(ISSN 2314-8721)

ISSN of the electronic version

(ISSN 2314-873X)

Egyptian National Scientific & Technical Information Network  
(ENSTINET)

With the permission of the Supreme Council for Media Regulation in Egypt  
Deposit Number: 24380 /2019

To request such permission or for further enquires, please contact:

#### APRA Publications

Al Arabia Public Relations Agency

Arab Republic of Egypt,  
Menofia - Shibeen El-Kom - Crossing Sabry Abo Alam st. & Al- Amin st.  
Postal Code: 32111 - P.O Box: 66

Or

Egyptian Public Relations Association

Arab Republic of Egypt,  
Giza, Dokki, Ben Elsarayat -1 Mohamed Alzoghpy St.

ceo@apr.agencyEmail: - jprr@epra.org.eg

Web: www.apr.agency, www.jprr.epra.org.eg

Phone: (+2) 0114 -15 -14 -157 - (+2) 0114 -15 -14 -151 - (+2) 02-376-20 -818

Fax: (+2) 048-231-00 -73

The Journal is indexed within the following international digital databases:



# **How did ISIS use Social Media to Spread its Extremist Ideas?: An Analytical Study**

***Dr. Bandar Jaber Dawshi*** (\*)

---

(\*) PhD in Mass Communication Studies at the University of Southern Mississippi in the United States.  
*Assistant Professor of Mass Communication, University of Bisha.*

## **How did ISIS use Social Media to Spread its Extremist Ideas?: An Analytical Study**

***Dr. Bandar Jaber Dawshi***

[b.doosh123@gmail.com](mailto:b.doosh123@gmail.com)

*PhD in Mass Communication Studies,*

*University of Southern Mississippi*

*Assistant Professor of Mass Communication,*

*University of Bisha*

### **Abstract**

This paper examines the rhetoric used by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to persuade thousands of young Muslims around the world to join the organization and defend it until the end. The Paper concerns the innovative methods used by the organization to reach thousands of young people around the world, and the role of misinterpretations of the Qur'an in supporting al-Baghdadi's rhetorical arguments and the role of social media in spreading extremist ideology. In order to provide a reasonable explanation for these speeches, the Paper used Aristotle's rhetorical methodology.

The arguments focused on studying rhetoric within the Isis organization, particularly the rhetorical methods of al-Baghdadi, and analyzing the persuasive elements in the extremist discourse. One speech of ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was selected for analysis. The article included (1) examining Al-Baghdadi's rhetorical methods and the slogans he used in his speeches; and (2) shedding light on the role of social media in spreading extremist ideology.

**Keywords:** ISIS, Social Media, Extremist Ideas.

### **Introduction:**

According to Tracy (2017), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Browne (2018) suggested that the crimes of ISIS have spread to many countries worldwide, and the group remains an international threat. Liang (2015) explained how ISIS is an extreme threat to international security in stating that it is a distinctive organization that depends on years of leadership experience, and warning it has the capacity for intimidation, recruitment, training, and even extortion. Tracy stressed that the organization has substantial economic resources that are not typically available to extremist organizations.

After the Arab Spring that swept many countries in the Middle East from 2010-2014, which toppled multiple authoritarian governments, the phenomenon of terrorism and Islamist extremism has emerged in an unprecedented way. This phenomenon exists due to a combination of factors, most notably the collapse of governments and sectarian conflicts that have grown in that climate of



instability. The emergence of several terrorist organizations was noticeable, such as Dahesh, al-Qaeda, the Nasra, and Fatah al-Sham, groups fighting in the name of the extreme interpretations of the Islamic religion. According to Holbrook (2010), these groups use verses from the Koran, and some of the teachings of Islam, such as the Prophet Muhammad's Hadith, to justify their crimes and hostile acts against innocent people in the Middle East and throughout the world. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index (2016), four organizations were responsible for 74% of the world's terrorist operations in 2015, namely ISIL, Bukharram, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda and its various branches.

Hoffman (1999) defined Islamic terrorism as an organized hostile act by an individual or an organized group to harm civilians and innocents, where the motive serves the purposes of God or Islam as interpreted by the extremists involved. Jackson (2007) asserts that many Muslims regard the term Islamic terrorism as inappropriate. They demand that Islam not be linked to terrorism because Muslims make many efforts to combat terrorism. This assumed link serves the propaganda of terrorist organizations that promote the notion that the West considers the whole of the Islamic religion as a terrorist organization, which revives the conflict between the West and the Muslims around the world.

According to Liang (2015), ISIS successfully recruited 45,000 foreign fighters, which was an unprecedented number. Experts and critics in the Middle East argued that the Islamic caliphate intended to control Arab and Islamic countries and establish an extremist union to fight the West. Essentially, ISIS has attempted to bring about the return of the Crusades with a modern twist of aggressively fighting them off. They consider that they are better suited to lead the world.

According to the American envoy to combat ISIS under President Obama, Brett McGurk, "40,000 foreign fighters came from 110 countries who joined ISIS and crossed the Turkish border for the sake of al-Baghdadi." This observation accounts only for the countries from which participants originated. The full impact of al-Baghdadi's influence includes the large numbers of ISIS members from these many countries; for example, there were tens of thousands of Syrians, Iraqis, and other Arabs involved in the extremist organization. These figures show al-Baghdadi's ability to persuade thousands of young people worldwide to dedicate themselves to the group and fight, even to the point of suicide, for the founding of a caliphate state. No other modern-day leader or organization has persuaded such large numbers of people from all over the world to join an extremist army. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose real name is Ibrahim al-Badri, was born in 1971 in Samarra, central Iraq. He obtained a baccalaureate degree in Islamic studies from the University of Baghdad in 1996. Also, he obtained a master's degree in 1999 and a doctorate in 2007 from Saddam Hussein University for Islamic Studies. He emerged as a leader of ISIS in Iraq several years later. Al-Baghdadi expressed leadership rhetoric in Arabic,

the primary language of Islam, because the Prophet Muhammad spoke only Arabic, and the Qur'an was written in Arabic. Consequently, the focus of this study is on the Arab Islamic discourse, which dominates the teachings of the Islamic religion.

Al-Baghdadi did not use any language other than Arabic in his speeches. Still, he had a vast media apparatus that exploited social media to translate his sermons and spread his principles in many languages.

The driving rationale for this article is that Islamist extremism has become a complex and challenging issue to address. Few studies that focus on terrorism include the goal of understanding the foundations and origins of organized terrorism. Terrorism begins with extremism. Extremism is a state of persuasion that has its roots in hard-line Islamic discourse, which is based on misunderstandings of the verses of the Qur'an and the words of the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, this study concerns the main elements of extremism and extremist discourse. For example, understanding the foundation and success of al-Baghdadi's speeches could prevent the emergence of another Baghdadi or new terrorist organization. As is well known, the elements that Osama Bin Laden, the al Qaeda leader, used are the same ones that al-Baghdadi relied upon.

This article helps to highlight the importance of fighting extremism intellectually through rhetoric in parallel with military action because understanding Islamic discourse and involved rhetorical techniques could support persuasive counter-messages to refute extremism and combat its spread. Unfortunately, terrorism cannot be defeated only through military solutions. This project could bridge the gap in knowledge concerning the methods of persuasion and communication adopted by extremist Islamic organizations. Researchers who study the Middle East have suggested that the battle of ideas is just as important as the military battle in defeating extremism and terrorism.

The purpose of this study is to analyze Islamist extremist discourse to understand why these groups are attractive and successful in recruiting thousands of young people around the world. It is a vital strategy to dismantle and refute this discourse. The arguments here focus on studying rhetoric within the ISIS organization, particularly the rhetorical methods of al-Baghdadi, and analyze the persuasive elements in the extremist discourse. These groups use various persuasive methods that are enlightened by a neo-Aristotelian methodology and use of the identity concept to create division and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. Additionally, the aim of this study is to explore how Islamist extremism as a persistent and integrated case of persuasion and rhetoric from the leader to the public; i.e., it is an ongoing phenomenon.

The arguments focus on studying rhetoric within the Isis organization, particularly the rhetorical methods of al-Baghdadi, and analyzing the persuasive elements in the extremist discourse. The aims of the article included (1)

examining Al-Baghdadi's rhetorical methods and the slogans he used in his speeches; and (2) shedding light on the role of social media in spreading extremist ideology.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

There are many definitions of persuasion; a broad definition is that persuasion can influence others to achieve a particular goal. A persuasive process aims to change the positions, beliefs, and behaviors of others. The basis of the persuasion process is the interaction between the interlocutors through a nested and flexible process founded on logic and science (Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjuma, 2009). The context of an interpersonal relationship defines the manifestation of persuasion. These exchanges can occur in diverse contexts such as relationships between a man and woman, friendships among co-workers and neighbors, and members of religious groups in their places of worship. These relationships have the power to withstand distinctive and changing life circumstances and are often unconditional with the consent or will of all parties. (Heath & Bryant, 2013).

Persuasion in personal relationships is not just about what we say, but also what we do during interactions (Kirmani & Campbell, 2004). For example, non-verbal communication may be more effective than verbal communication. Personal care, smile, and physical gestures can be just as compelling as a conversation. It is essential to realize that persuasion among people does not always mean winning or defeating the other; instead, it provides an appropriate response to ensure a common interest or goal. For example, persuasive arguments can be useful in marital dialogues, between brothers and sisters, and friends. In other words, objectives of persuasion in personal interactions include reinforcing compatibility and satisfaction among parties as they continue their relationships (Kirmani & Campbell, 2004; Peters, 2007).

The goals and strategies of persuasion in personal relationships can vary across contexts, as do persuasion strategies in public communications. Theories of persuasion and communication can be used in many areas of research, including marketing, advertising, politics, education, health, and personal relationships. With the advent of social networks, persuasion processes became widely available. Social networks have contributed to the transmission of persuasion messages to many people simultaneously in many countries and with different languages. The structures of persuasive speeches have become more straightforward due to social media (Colliander & Dahlén, 2011). These means of communication have also contributed to the rise in protest and social movements, which have included demands for change worldwide.

### *Social Media and the Arab Spring*

Many Arab countries have witnessed an unprecedented rise in social protests in recent years. Social movements have grown such that the people are

expressing their opposition to ruling political regimes and international policies. These movements have crystallized various forms of protest by taking advantage of social media techniques and networks based on different forms of material and symbolic resources. These movements have become unprecedented and have spurred the Arab revolutions that the region has known (social, 2017). In Arab nations, the year 2011 marked the emergence of global interest in social movements, protests, and strikes. The so-called “Arab Spring,” a vast protest movement against the Arab ruling regimes, was aimed at fighting dictatorial regimes and creating better and independent lives for the people. Demonstrators in Europe also staged protested austerity, and the “Occupy Wall Street” movement took over a park in New York City. These events prompted communication scientists to study these social movements and the role of the media in their emergence (Foust & Hoyt, 2018).

Recent years have included a wave of many studies, contributing to a better understanding of social movements, social media, and persuasive concepts. Calls have emerged from many researchers to combine the best approaches to critical and media rhetoric environments to study and interpret social movements. These calls include recognizing movements as rhetorical achievements and forces strengthening social identity bonds (Foust & Hoyt, 2018).

Social movement researchers defined these action groups as mostly informal organizations, based on shared beliefs, such as freedom of expression, healthcare for all, and fighting corruption. These groups are mobilized and use all kinds of protests to bring about changes (Della Porta & Mattoni, 2015). Historically, social movements have succeeded in using persuasive messages as influential tools to turn the grievances of marginalized classes into the interests of dominant groups. Activists have used the media as a tool to influence public thinking and feelings about their issues effectively (Lane et al., 2019). Some findings of social movements suggested that their messages may be more convincing when they come from the dominant ethnic groups rather than marginalized groups (Lane et al., 2019).

Most researchers studying social movements have suggested that behind all movements are the convincing speeches and means of their communication that disseminate rhetoric. Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have provided more opportunities for activism and social movements. Twitter hashtags serve as a framework for many protest movements, allowing activists and those interested in a topic to interact, thus, contributing and enriching these issues and protest movements. For example, the hashtag "Black Lives Matter" is the umbrella for millions of supporters tweeting this movement. Using this hashtag and others, the supports have renewed momentum for this movement and raised interests in racial incidents in the United States (Moscato, 2016).

The social media give protest movements the space to spread issues away from traditional media filters (Moscato, 2016). Social media provide a means of forming global networks driven by angry citizens, who are vital to mobilizing

international support and nurturing global public discourse (Zhu, 2017). Social media provide a unique space for protest movements to present a vision, spread their discourse, and present arguments in a way that the mainstream media could not provide. Kavada (2016) argued that digital media further facilitates decentralized, dispersed, transient, and individual forms of political action. These often appear to oppose the concept of the community. The importance of social media for contemporary protest movements has been highlighted from different perspectives, and much of the focus has been on the functions of social networks for sharing information and reaching a broad audience. The goals of using these media include convincing the users of a cause and organizing protests (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).

All over the world, young people are taking advantage of new media to engage in civic issues and protest movements. This move initially indicated the enormous potential for change at the global level. The emergence of new political actors and new forms of social movements such as the Arab Spring, the Occupy Wall Street movement, Black Lives Matter, March for Our Lives, and the Global Climate Strikes provide examples of creative ways which people use new media. Using these media, they exchange information, persuade new members, communicate with peers, and mobilize to advance their causes and create social mobility challenging to control (Lee, 2020).

Researchers describe the relationships between social movements and the media as a complex and dynamic interaction. It is well-known that all social movements need the media to attract the necessary attention to their cause, and in return, the media interest in controversial social and protest movements adds attention to the media sources and attracts the masses. For these protest movements to be influential in the political process and cultural practices, these movements need the support and attention of the public. These media offer opportunities to attract new members and exert pressure on their opponents, whether these be governments or regimes (Malinick et al., 2013).

Social movements are increasingly using social media to organize collective action and social movements. The growth of protest movements has shown how social media can mobilize support and momentum; a prime example is the Black Lives Matter movement. Social media provide a forum or space where those interested in protest movements can compete and struggle over the essence, meaning, and direction of the social movement (Wilkins et al., 2019). Scholars have suggested that social media can perform the rhetorical functions of social movements by determining the scope and agenda of protest movements. For instance, the media can shape who is part of the movement and the external objectives (Wilkins et al., 2019). Social media helps form the political discourse of protest movements, as defined by the strategies used to create persuasive arguments. Social media can structure the argument and develop the group's functions. Speech is the tool used strategically by leaders and activists during social movements to build causes, convince the crowd, and counter the

counter-rhetoric to achieve their goals. A rhetorical perspective on social media activity can provide insight into activists' discussions of their movement's methods. For example, how do the members manage the movement beyond the immediate members of the target group, and how do those who formed the group maintain control? (Wilkins et al., 2019).

### *The Beginning of Extremism in Islam*

Khan (2014) presented a logical explanation for the early beginnings of Islamist extremism. Khan described Islamist extremism movements as beginning in the 7th century with the Kharijites as the first movement. This group had political aims and ambitions. This movement adopted a dangerous approach—whoever was against them was an unbeliever and must be killed.

In contrast, Moore (2015) monitored the progression of terrorist movement timelines. Based on that research, he contends that the genesis of extremist movements arose in the early 1960s after the failure of the Western colonialism of the Arab and Islamic countries. During that period, revolutionary and popular anti-Western movements grew, but these were not religious. In the early 1960s, after the emergence of Israel in the Middle East, secular armed movements emerged. According to Moore, the Palestinian movement, Fatah, was the first armed group that targeted civilians outside the conflict zones. In 1979, the Iranian revolution broke out, which further destabilized the Middle East. The situation worsened after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. This invasion fomented the emergence of Islamist extremist movements in Central and South Asia and the broader Greater Middle East. The war between these radical movements and the Soviet invaders continued from 1979 to 1989, ending with a victory for the Islamic groups in Afghanistan. After this victory, these groups, specifically al-Qaida, began attacking targets outside the battle zones and bombing US embassies. According to Moore, these attacks culminated in the suicide attacks that destroyed the Twin Towers and part of the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.

Liang (2015) continued explaining the development of other branches of terrorist groups following Moore's (2015) logic. Liang pointed out that after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's leadership. In the evolution of the movement, al-Qaeda became the nucleus of the ISIS organization, which took control of large areas in Iraq and Syria in 2014-2015. Allendorfer and Herring (2015) defined ISIS as a militant and violent group that claimed to have revived the Islamic caliphate or Islamic Empire based on the group's control of large areas of Iraq and Syria, which lasted from 2015-2018. These authors explained that the organization relies on its professional religious propaganda.

*The establishment of ISIS.* The Middle East is a conflict arena for several different competing forces, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and Iran. The Arab Spring of 2010-2011 produced chaos and emptiness in that region because they have conflicting goals in using the Arab Spring for gain. These

conflicts have supported the emergence of extremist organizations (Abouzeid, 2014). One of the most dangerous of these was ISIS, which exploited the flaws and territory left empty by the governments in Syria and Iraq and dominated large areas in that region. Observers suggested that the emergence of ISIS and its rapid control of vast territories in Iraq and Syria were shocking to the world. ISIS exploited chaos and emptiness, and the state of the Islamic caliphate was proclaimed through a speech by al-Baghdadi in 2014 (Abouzeid, 2014).

ISIS's control over vast areas was not born of the moment, and the speeches and declarations of the leader of ISIS were not created in a vacuum. These resulted from a long struggle over many years and was accompanied by conditions of suffering in the Middle East (Knights, 2014). Cronin (2015) suggests that ISIS began as a small extremist Sunni organization after America's occupation of Iraq in 2003. At this point, it was known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. The organization's central idea was that of resisting what they referred to as the American Occupier. At that time, the organization was called al-Qaeda in Iraq and was led by Zarqawi, who owed allegiance to Osama bin Laden, but was killed by a US airstrike in June 2006.

Wood (2015) stated that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was the leader of the organization beginning in May 2010, but al-Baghdadi made a dramatic appearance in his famous 2014 speech in Mosul, Iraq. This speech became famous because it is the first official appearance of al-Baghdadi after his disappearance for years, although al-Baghdadi released some short audio records before appearing publicly for the first time. Several security services were tracking him. After the organization achieved its goals, al-Baghdadi thought it was the right time to emerge and announced the establishment of the new Islamic state. His appearance was remarkable and gave a morale boost to his followers. He created influential rhetoric at that time. Wood identified a clear message from al-Baghdadi: it is the time to act because he was no longer a gang leader, but was now the leader of all Muslims. Wood (2015) concluded that al-Baghdadi might have felt a vacuum after the killing of Bin Laden; thus, he aimed to fill the gap and show Islamic leadership.

Georges (2016) indicated the timing of al-Baghdadi's 2014 speech has multiple meanings because it came in the month of Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims when believers are committed to fasting during some the days of the month. Notably, this speech was the first in which al-Baghdadi appeared to the public. Al-Baghdadi frequently made short audio recordings before he appeared in public, and these recordings contributed to people recognizing him. The organization showed videos of speeches on social media and the organization's websites. He wore religious clothing and chose Friday prayers to deliver it, as Muslims gathered to pray every week. He gave the speech in the Mosul Grand Mosque after ISIS gained control of Isis Zhi, a city where more than two million people lived. The significance of giving the speech during Ramadan was that it was the month in which Allah revealed the Qur'an. The Prophet



Muhammad achieved a decisive victory during that month against a tribe, the Quraish, who had rejected his prophecy. According to Georges (2016), the appearance of al-Baghdadi in a US-controlled city in Iraq was more daring than Osama Bin Laden. He thus dramatically appeared in Ramadan as a spiritual leader of Muslims.

The division between ISIS and Al Qaeda had occurred before Baghdadi's famous speech made in 2014 amid a sharp split between ISIS and al-Qaeda, at a time when historians considered ISIS in Iraq as only one of many al Qaeda affiliates, such as those in Yemen and Somalia. O'Shea (2016) explained the historical disparity between the two organizations when the split between the organization of ISIS and Al Qaeda appeared in 2013. At that time, the ISIS group was under the command of Abu Ayyub al-Masri until al-Baghdadi overturned Zawahiri's orders and took control of the organization (Birke, 2013). Al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of the Islamic caliphate state in Iraq and Syria in 2014 and accused al-Zawahiri of surrendering to the West. Al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate after he dissolved al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant in 2006. However, the declaration of the caliphate state in Iraq and Syria came after the organization's takeover of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2014 (Knights, 2014).

Al-Baghdadi took advantage of the Syrian revolution and the collapse of the regime in large parts of Syria, succeeding in extending control of Iraqi territory near the Syrian border. Gerges (2016) stated that at that time, the Iraqi regime, under the leadership of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, was suffering from limited central authority amid the spread of the sectarian approach adopted by the government. Georges explained that this led to the accession of thousands of Sunnis to the organization of ISIS. Georges described the conditions as critical in the Middle East, especially after the failure of the Arab Spring in Syria and Iraq, the outbreak of sectarian wars, the flight of tens of thousands from conflict zones, and the displacement of at least 7 million Syrians amid the absence of justice. The decline of the US role in the Middle East under the leadership of former President Obama was a political stalemate to the international community. The Obama administration ignored the conflict in Syria and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, which allowed Isis to expand in those areas." ISIS, for a while, managed to preserve the territory al-Baghdadi controlled, unlike other extremist organizations that hide in remote places around the world (Knights, 2014).

This Paper should bridge the gap in knowledge concerning the methods of persuasion and communication adopted by extremist Islamist organizations. Researchers who study the Middle East have suggested that the battle of ideas is just as important as the military battle in defeating extremism and terrorism. The organizations like Isis certainly relied on traditions of Islamic discourse, which are explored next. This Paper sought to pursue understanding of how this was done, suggesting the second question:



RQ1: What are the persuasive elements and arguments on which al-Baghdadi 's rhetoric was based ?

### **Methodology:**

In summary, I discussed in the literature review the concept of persuasion, the contribution of social media in supporting protest revolutions, the main concepts embodying persuasion in Islamic extremist discourse in general, and radical discourse by al-Baghdadi. This project seeks to bridge the gap in knowledge concerning the methods of persuasion and communication adopted by extremist Islamist organizations by exploring critical questions about extremist rhetoric in the person of al-Baghdadi. To reiterate the study's research question :

RQ1: What are the persuasive elements and arguments on which al-Baghdadi 's rhetoric was based ?

Next, I examine the ways to analyze and critique al-Baghdadi 's primary discourse and appeals that began in 2014 and occurred in various circumstances. Following the methodology chapter, I use Aristotle's traditional methodology I then examine the speech and focus on invention, integration of arguments and logic into speech, and the existence of evidence. Also, I focus on arrangements, especially the structure of the discourse presented, the body, and the conclusions in the discourse seeking enthymemes the audiences were expected to supply. The style is the subject of much discussion, such as understandable and simple language and strong and connected ideas. Finally, I analyze al-Baghdadi's speech and his intellect in using words at appropriate times and linking them to the verses of the Qur'an.

#### *The Neo-Aristotelian Approach*

Arabic literature is influenced by Greek literature. During the ninth and twelfth centuries, Ibn Rushd translated and transmitted Aristotle's studies, including rhetoric. Moreover, these works were studied in Arab learning centers. Ibn Rushd was working according to the Prophet Muhammad (seek knowledge even in China). Ibn Rushd had argued that the study of Greek logic and philosophical discourse complemented the teachings of Islam rather than contradicted them (Clark, 2007). Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sina, and Al-Farabi presented extensive studies on the book of Aristotle's rhetoric and transferred them to the Arabic language, which was affected by this addition (Ezzaher, 2015). The entry of Aristotle's logic into the Islamic intellectual environment led to creating what was termed "the linguistic obstacle in Aristotle's logic." This concept raised disparities regarding structure and meaning in the Arabic and Greek languages. Ibn Rushd succeeded in addressing this obstacle through his commentaries on Aristotle's logic. Ibn Rushd had a great appreciation for Aristotle's philosophy, and this admiration was reflected in Averroes's treatment of questions of logic and his adoption of Aristotle's views on these issues. (Borrowman, 2008).

To examine al-Baghdadi 's ISIS rhetoric, Aristotle's methodology was chosen to fit with key appeals to the Holy Quran and the Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad. The Qur'an is a 1,400-year-old book with the inherent goal of persuading people to enter Islam. The rhetoric of the Qur'an depends on warnings, promises, and carrots. The Arab tribes agreed that the Prophet was a virtuous and righteous man, who did not drink wine and engage with women and was honest. Indeed, these attributes supported the Prophet's position as a gentleman calling for a new religion, raising slogans of self-cleansing, and calling for good deeds. He proclaimed the avoidance of ugly deeds such as lying, theft, and adultery, and reminded people of the greatest reward, heaven. The Prophet Muhammad succeeded in spreading Islam based on the Qur'an's discourse and the ongoing, persuasive processes backed by Hadiths that explain the Qur'an's approach. Today more than 1.2 billion people have converted to this Islam.

Under these auspices, al-Baghdadi adopted the approach of the Prophet Muhammad, and as such, al-Baghdadi 's speeches were mainly supported by the verses of the Qur'an and the Hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad. al-Baghdadi 's appeals were for a return to the natural Islam of Muhammad, and he likened a strategy for a state to that of the Prophet. He raised the slogan of restoring the glories of credible Islam. On his first appearance, al-Baghdadi's words wore the same clothes that those of the Prophet Muhammad wore. Al-Baghdadi's speech even mimicked the speeches of the Prophet Muhammad using the same words. Typically, al-Baghdadi's rhetoric was a classic based on the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad.

The choice of rhetorical lens depends on the rhetorical critic's appreciation of the piece he wants to analyze. "The rhetorical critic is free to see the discourse historically, relatively, publicly or in isolation," according to Black (quoted in Abel, 1993). Burghardt (2005) also held that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is one of the essential books influencing rhetorical scholars through history. He holds that Aristotle is relied upon by scholars in most rhetorical treatises, and argued that Aristotle's definition of rhetoric means that it is not a specific technique with fixed procedural rules but merely the ability to find elements of persuasion in a particular speech. Aristotle also noted that rhetorical speech is not limited in scope by the actual means of persuasion used, but can contain all the means of persuasion available to the speaker, whether all the means are used. Aristotle intended that scholars consider the content of the speaker, what the situation calls for, and the resources are available. This process refers to a careful analysis of the situation motivating the discourse, the surrounding circumstances, and the problem the discourse was intended to solve.

The Neo-Aristotelian methodology provides a reasonable explanation of the methods of persuasion and answers why a discourse was convincing and why a speech influenced people. The rhetorical strategy offers a hidden vision

in the discourse that the average person does not realize. The traditional or neo-Aristotelian approach is based on the ancient Greek and Roman critics. The approach assumes that the discourse acts to expose rational and sincere appeals to the masses. In this methodology, the critic focuses on the ethical, logical, and motivational elements in which the discourse works to achieve persuasion. According to Black's perception of the value of Aristotle's methodology, it is appropriate to analyze al-Baghdadi's radical discourse, in which he uses appeals to show himself as a virtuous cleric who promises a great future for Muslim youth. Consequently, it is not easy to apply the narrative, feminist, or other methodology to al-Baghdadi 's speech because the feminist methodology is suitable for feminist rhetoric and movement. In other words, each rhetorical methodology fits better with varying specific rhetorical types.

Every critic or researcher has a specific view of the artifact; in other words, there is no right or wrong reading (Foss, 2004). Neo-Aristotelian rhetorical criticism consists of two constituents: historical and judicial. First, the critic seeks historically to reconstruct the context within which the rhetoric was operative. Second, the critic attempts to judge the effectiveness of the speaker's use of the principles of rhetoric in accomplishing a goal (Hendrix, 1968).

Aristotle's rhetoric suggested three critical pathways to persuasion; the methods of ethos, pathos, and logos. Aristotle defined these modes of persuasion as (a) ethos or the credible personal characteristics of the speaker, (b) pathos or the emotion the speaker projects to the listeners, and (c) logos or the use of compelling arguments to support facts and make a specific case (Allen, 2007). In Aristotle's' framework, ethos is the public assessment of the credibility of appeals made by an authority figure, such as political, lawyer, cleric, and others. As suggested above, pathos is an emotional appeal that convinces and provokes the audience; for example, these appeals might be in the form of metaphors, descriptions, or allegations of injustice (Tollefson, 2017).

Among the components of ethos, which include language and credibility, the enthymeme is the main component of the logical appeals for the speech. Enthymemes use implied or hinting phrases in the speech that can convey the message without directly speaking them. The point becomes clear and understandable to the listener, even if it is not pronounced directly. It is considered vital because it allows the audience to supply conclusions and clarify the speaker's argument or hypothesis. The method is standard in politics, advertising, and literary discourse. It is an effective method used to persuade the audience through suggestion or implication. Aristotle deemed the enthymeme the main body of persuasion. The focus of his methodology is on the internal elements of a discourse. Using these components, discourse is examined using the core qualities such as ideas, organization, reasonable use of language, and delivery (Urbanski, 2016). Through the analysis of al-Baghdadi 's speeches, I expect to see these elements of al-Baghdadi 's speeches. Al-Baghdadi was very

interested in persuasion and would use many such arguments and rhetorical elements to persuade the audience.

Aristotle's methodology focuses on the persuasive elements of a discourse. When reviewing the artifact, the researcher should answer five key points to read the artifact accurately. The first point concerns invention. How was the artifact built? What is the argument? Does the piece focus on emotion, logic, or credibility? The second point is, how is the artifact arranged and organized? In other words, what is its structure? Point three concerns style: what language was used? Is the piece creative or lacking inspiration, or is it professional and sophisticated? The fourth point is, did the rhetoric seem to be in control? The issue of control includes a review of awareness and ability. The fifth point includes the connection between speaker and audience and how the speech was delivered and the circumstances surrounding the speech. In this case, an analyst must consider the speaker's attractiveness, insight, confidence, and quality, as well as other traits (Urbanski, 2016). In a study in which the traditional Aristotelean methodology was applied to public diplomacy in the mixed-motive situation, Zhang (2010) concentrated on five elements in the speeches which were included in the discussion. These were an invention, organization, style, delivery, and memory. These are the same elements to be analyzed in the rhetoric of the leader of ISIS. The analysis also focused on credibility appeals and ethics in the speech.

### **Al-Baghdadi's Speeches:**

The first speech. Al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance when giving a speech on June -July, 2014, in the Great Mosque in the Iraqi city of Mosul after ISIS had seized the city. In this well-known speech, al-Baghdadi presented two main messages: first, a dominant Islamic state must be established based on Islamic identity, and second, this goal of an Islamic state could be achieved by continuing jihad and fighting the infidels who pose a threat to the Islamic identity. The speech contained a religious invitation from a clergyman who considered himself as the leader of the Islamic Ummah. At the time, large parts of Syria and much of Iraq were under the control of ISIS, and the international coalition against terrorism had not yet been formed. Conditions were favorable for al-Baghdadi to expand his power faster than he had expected.

## **RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH**

Analysis of each speech sets the context for each and then suggests neo-Aristotelian, Nasserian, and identity/identification elements found in each.

### ***The First Speech:***

To analyze the content and form of a discourse, the historical context and the circumstances of a speech should be explored. For example, the historical setting for the rise of al-Baghdadi and ISIS was one of turmoil for the Middle East. Al-Baghdadi had become known to Muslims across the area through recorded audio speeches. That is, the speech is often considered as the “first” address to the public by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the leader of ISIS but was not his first. Many audio recordings were used to convey al-Baghdadi’s speeches during the organization’s rise in Iraq, and some of these preceded this first speech in which he appeared in public. Thus, the so-called first speech is considered the speech that brought al-Baghdadi directly to the public for the first time. From the audio recordings, the public could quickly identify his voice and rhetorical style. The early victories for the organization prompted the choice of making a physical appearance for this specific speech. ISIS had, in the recent past, taken control of vast areas in Iraq and Syria, gaining control of territories that exceeded the land areas of Syria and Iraq.

The Middle East and Syria were described as in chaos. Syrians were living in a struggle between the dictator Bashar al-Assad and protesters who wanted a better future without dictatorship. The Syrian conflict had turned into an armed battle. Many countries were involved in supporting one of the parties in this conflict; however, the major lines of supporters were Iran and Russia, which chose to support the Assad regime, and the Arab, European and American countries choosing to support the demonstrators. Security systems had collapsed in most of Syria, leaving ways for many different armed groups to enter the stage. In Iraq, the situation was not better than Syria; protests broke out to call for a revolution and a better life. Under these conditions, with the absence of stable governments and the collapse of services, Isis emerged and gradually filled the void by becoming a unifying organization. Much of the world was preoccupied with the devastation in Syria and the massive waves of Syrians who were displaced. Thus, ISIS took the opportunity to seize much of the area in disarray using violent tactics, oppression, and torture to control the troubled areas.

After ISIS came to the fore, countries in the Middle East experienced this organization as a broad danger that expanded across the borders of countries. Middle Eastern countries considered the organization as a viable threat to all in the region without exception. The fears stemmed from the ISIS dogma that Arab regimes were agents of the West, and they should be removed. The organization had an appetite to expand and control even more land by toppling Arab regimes and taking advantage of the Arab Spring. The latter issue is salient because al-Baghdadi sought to take advantage of the despair of youth in the region; thus, much of his discourse was aimed at youth. During this period, the Iraqi authorities leaked information that al-Baghdadi was killed or seriously

injured from an airstrike, making his appearance in-person all the more striking to his young followers.

One of the characteristics of Islamic discourse is that it begins with praise for the Lord and the Prophet Muhammad and ends with the same appreciation for the Lord and the Prophet Muhammad. The more the speaker praises the Lord and the Prophet Muhammad, the more he draws in and impresses the listeners. Thus, true to expectations at the beginning of the sermon, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi praised the Lord and the Prophet Muhammad, but importantly, he did so in ways similar to those Osama bin Laden used in speeches. In most Islamic speeches, whether in Friday prayers or public speeches, the speaker begins with praise because it is a discursive religious practice that began during the era of the Prophet Muhammad and continues today. Al-Baghdadi said,

All praise is due to Allah. We thank him and seek His assistance and His forgiveness. O Allah, defend us from the evil of ourselves and the evils of our actions. Whoever is guided by Allah will never be misguided, and whoever is made lost by Allah will never be guided. (Al-Baghdadi, 2014)

However, by invoking the memory of Osama bin Laden, al-Baghdadi created continuity with the past cause of al-Qaeda and bin Laden's discourse directed to youth.

With this classical religious and preaching style, al-Baghdadi focused on building credibility as a religious man, preacher, and expert in Islamic teachings, who wanted to display virtuous morals by appealing to the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad and linking them to his new rhetoric. In Islamic teachings, presenting an impression of being religious is key to a person holding integrity and credibility before the public. In other words, the more religious persons portray themselves, the more profound the impact of persuasion on the listeners. Using these emotional appeals, al-Baghdadi was keen to show people that he is the opposite of the Arab regimes, which he presented as secular and full of corruption. Al-Baghdadi used the duality of truth and falsehood by summoning his image as a pious cleric who could lead his new state in a strictly religious approach against corruption, tyranny, and secular regimes. Al-Baghdadi viewed the Arab regimes mired in corruption and as having no legitimacy. Thus, people revolted against them, as happened in the Arab Spring.

Consequently, al-Baghdadi portrayed these regimes as evil and positioned himself as a reformer and leader who can fight these evils and chart a better future. In this presentation, he used the style of speech, as did Gamal Abdel Nasser; al-Baghdadi directed the speech to a broader audience, in this case, the Islamic nation, just as Abdel Nasser aimed beyond just the state of Egypt by directing speeches to Muslims in the Arab nations. Al-Baghdadi used the same slogans that Nasser promoted, with themes such as social justice, fighting corruption, and concern for the youth and the working class, which are attractive messages in the Arab world. He expressed, "O Muslims, reaching Ramadan is a great blessing and great grace from Allah. The beginning of the

month is mercy, its middle is forgiveness, and its end is protection from the fire “(Al Baghdadi 2014). He also implied the need to change wealth distribution among the population and provide free education and healthcare. Muslims do not believe in taxes, and there are Hadiths about the Prophet Muhammad in which he cautioned about taxes. Instead of taxes, a condition of Islam is that money is paid by merchants and the rich to benefit the poor. These funds are called zakat and are paid annually in the month of Ramadan.

Al-Baghdadi continued the talk by recalling the virtues of Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims. During Ramadan, Muslims are obliged to fast from dawn to sunset for the 30 days. The Prophet Muhammad stressed that during this month, Muslims must be careful with acts of worship so they might receive God’s rewards. Following this tradition, al-Baghdadi used many Qur’anic verses and prophetic Hadiths urging Muslims to give their best in this month. In the time of the Prophet Muhammad, Ramadan was considered the month of victories because he defeated his opponents in the first battle, and it was in Ramadan. Therefore, al-Baghdadi and other extremists use these older oratory practices to describe modern era victories to revive these older traditions for the audience. As al-Baghdadi mentioned the virtues of Ramadan and the work of worship, he was linking Ramadan to jihad by connecting the call to jihad with the Prophet Muhammad’s actions when fighting his opponents. He described Ramadan,

It is a month in which for Allah we are protected from hell, and this is every night – nights during which the marketplace of jihad is opened. The Messenger, Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, would hold in it the brigades and arm the armies to fight the enemies of Allah to do jihad against the polytheists (Al Baghdadi, 2014)

Al-Baghdadi was deliberately using religion to convince Muslims to join ISIS by comparing the Prophet Muhammad’s approach to his, which included running the ISIS state as based on jihad. In this example, al-Baghdadi demonstrated the concept of identity by creating common ground with the public and speaking about the virtues of Ramadan and its importance to Muslims.

Al-Baghdadi used an enthymeme by declaring Ramadan as the month of jihad and mentioned that during Ramadan, the Prophet Muhammad had prepared armies to fight the enemies of God and non-Muslims. Al-Baghdadi was leading the audience to conclude that they must join ISIS during Ramadan to fight against the enemies of God and the non-Muslims because their reward is doubled during this time. The historical event represents the Prophet Muhammad’s time for preparing for jihad. The message was implicit that if a person is a Muslim and a lover of the Prophet Muhammad, then they should join ISIS and declare jihad against the enemies of Allah. Recently, jihad has raised considerable controversy among Muslim scholars, especially concerning its conditions, motives, and timing. In his narrative, al-Baghdadi needed to



resolve the issue and emphasize that jihad is one of the constants of Islamic identity; he considered it the first defense of the Islamic identity of external threats. In this slogan, al-Baghdadi mentioned the virtues of jihad and the necessity of fighting non-Muslims to protect the Islamic identity from threats.

Al-Baghdadi took these implicit messages further and launched a new appeal to Muslims that he explicitly supported using verses of the Qur'an. Al-Baghdadi simplified the logic he used to sway the audience to join ISIS by convincing people that God created them to believe him and establish his religion. Al-Baghdadi further declared that God had ordered the fight against enemies and jihad to achieve God's goal and establish religion linked to al-Baghdadi. Again al-Baghdadi used an enthymeme that when people engage in jihad or fight along with ISIS, they abide by Allah's orders. Therefore, they are moving away from the category of sinners who do not care about Allah's orders.

Al-Baghdadi extended the argument for forming a new country by stating that power is the key to applying Islamic law as God has ordered Muslims to follow; thus, holding power serves Islamic law. This discourse began the official declaration from al-Baghdadi that the new state will differ from secular and corrupt Arab regimes. He emphasized that in the new state, Islamic law will be applied vigorously, thus, making his call to extremists and hardliners to support the formation of this state. Al-Baghdadi stated that the basis of religion is a book that directs and a sword to support the book;

O people, the religion of Allah, blessed be He, is not established and this goal for which Allah created us is not achieved but by empowering the Shariah of Allah and being judged by it and establishing the restrictions, and this is only done with power and authority. This is the establishment of the religion: a Book that guides and a sword that supports (Al Baghdadi, 2014).

In this message, al-Baghdadi emphasized the sword because it was an important symbol for Muslims during the reign of the Prophet Muhammad, who triumphed over his opponents and spread Islam. These statements were al-Baghdadi's attempts to link his approaches to those of the Prophet Muhammad directly.

Al-Baghdadi described the actions of ISIS; he began by telling the story of the group's decisive victories and widespread control over parts of Syria and Iraq. He pointedly referred to Syrians and Iraqis as brothers. In this story, al-Baghdadi invoked the symbolism of brothers in Islam and the need to support and help brothers in their jihad and struggle. Al-Baghdadi developed the argument by describing that his jihadist strategy successfully achieved significant victories on the ground after many years of jihad and patience. He resounded that ISIS achieved their most important goal: creating the so-called Islamic caliphate and the appointment of an imam for the state, who would be al-Baghdadi. He described these actions, specifically jihad and the establishment of the caliphate state, as religious duties for all Muslims. Al-



Baghdadi was creating a foundation for his country by demanding the support of all Muslims. He insisted they demonstrate their support by denouncing Muslims who disregarded their “duty” to join him. These messages were an implicit call for jihad and to join the new caliphate state that he founded on behalf of Muslims, thusly, positioning himself as a caliph of Muslims.

Extremist Muslims believe that there will be a caliphate state, a large country composed of all the Islamic countries. Al-Baghdadi focused their belief that the time was now to create this so-called central state based on the prediction of the Prophet Muhammad. Playing on these beliefs, al-Baghdadi urged the audience to support the caliphate state that he established using the words of the Prophet Muhammad. In these passages of the speech, al-Baghdadi strengthened his position as a virtuous man entrusted with much responsibility, that is, the management of the new caliphate. To emphasize his commitment and need for the assistance of others, al-Baghdadi insinuated that the task of heading the caliphate was a plague and a challenge he did not want:

I have been plagued with this great matter, plagued with this responsibility, and it is a heavy responsibility. I was placed as your caretaker, and I am not better than you. So, if you found me to be right then help me, and if you found me to be wrong then advise me and make me right and obey me in what I obey Allah through you. If I disobey Him then there is no obedience to me from you. (Al Baghdadi, 2014).

By emphasizing the difficulties, al-Baghdadi puts forth an image of an ordinary person called to duty. The aim was to address the likely questions from the masses concerning his background and qualifications to be the caliph of Muslims. Al-Baghdadi was begging the question: what is the difference between him and the leaders of the Arab regimes? In his rhetorical response, al-Baghdadi humbled himself by stating he is no better than ordinary people, and he went further to indicate he would not invent a new constitution or governance—he intended to rely on God and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. He explained that the aim was to apply Islamic law as the Prophet Muhammad did, an approach that Muslims believe is successful. To identify himself with the tradition of transfer of power within Islam, al-Baghdadi repeated the saying of leader Abu Bakr, who was appointed leader of Muslims after the Prophet Muhammad died. In an approach to project the image of a humble man, he called on Muslims to support him if he did the right things and advise him if he made mistakes. In this display of faux humility, al-Baghdadi appears as a virtuous man as he attempts to persuade Muslims by linking his administrative state to God and calling Muslims to obey him as a caliphate only when he follows God’s orders, but not when he violates Allah’s laws. These words are intended to guarantee Muslims that al-Baghdadi would be a virtuous leader who differs from the leaders of the Arab regimes. Al-Baghdadi then continues the process of persuasion by linking his approach and his state to God’s laws and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammed. Al-Baghdadi devoted

his speech entirely to Muslims, and his speech was directed to create common ground with the public and strengthen social ties with Muslims.

Through the discourse described above, al-Baghdadi seeks to persuade the masses that his leadership of the state reflects God's orders. He equated the establishing of the state as one of the promises of God that he fulfilled with patience and hard work. The central message was that God's promises are fulfilled for the people who obey Allah and abiding by al-Baghdadi's orders. Al-Baghdadi repeatedly reminded Muslims of the importance of jihad for the sake of God, and he incited Muslims to jihad by urging them to be patient and steadfast because jihad is hard and tiring. He emphasized that God's reward is great for the mujahedeen, whether in this world or the day after death, the reward will be paradise. Recalling the virtues of jihad and its importance to Allah was an explicit attempt to recruit more Muslims to join his new country.

Al-Baghdadi then concluded this first sermon with a classic ending that all Muslim clerics use in their sermons on Friday. The closing was also used by the Prophet Muhammad and his followers in their sermons as well. Al-Baghdadi asked God for forgiveness for himself and all Muslims, and he urged Muslims to pray to God with confidence that God will fulfill their wishes. Al-Baghdadi then began the second sermon (considered part of the same "first speech" he delivered in public) after a few minutes of silence, an Islamic tradition applied in Friday prayers. The second sermon is usually given more quickly and concisely than the first, and it begins with praise to God and the Prophet Muhammad while reminding Muslims of the need to obey God alone and follow the orders of the Prophet Muhammad, who facilitates obedience to Allah. In this second sermon, Al-Baghdadi did not depart from the tradition to praise God, the Prophet Muhammad, and the friends of the Prophet Muhammad and those who applied their approach. Then he praises Allah again.

As the speech progressed, al-Baghdadi started a new appeal to Muslims, describing them as servants of Allah, and calling them to establish religion in fear of God. He stated the message as:

There is no god but Allah alone without a partner. He was honest with His promise, supported His soldiers, and defeated the Parties alone. There is no god but Allah alone without a partner, and loyalty is to Him with the religion even if the disbelievers hate it. O worshipers of Allah, establish your religion and fear Allah, so that He may dignify you in this world and the hereafter. If you want security, fear Allah. If you want a living, fear Allah (Al Baghdadi, 2014).

In these words, al-Baghdadi was implicitly suggesting that the Arab regimes do not apply the Islamic religion correctly, and do not rightly adhere to it. Al-Baghdadi implies that returning to true Islam is the solution to all the problems of Muslims; thus, making a vigorous argument that is also used by extremists to recruit Muslims. Al-Baghdadi reiterates the use of the term jihad and links it to a right and sound life, and making clear it is one of God's orders that should not

be ignored. He then stated that Allah has called for the unification of Muslims and used this to invoke an argument to form an Islamic state. The argument is consistent with some concepts from social identity theory, i.e., the aims of self-restoration and group pride. Al-Baghdadi's goal for his state was to restore the dignity of the Islamic nation. He set out to revive the Muslim sense of belonging to Islam rather than nation-states. Al-Baghdadi also exaggerated the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims as he called for a fight against them. One of the concepts of the social identity theory includes that when categorizing people, a communicator will attempt to overstate differences between groups.

Al-Baghdadi concludes the second sermon (and his first public speech) by praying to God to remedy the Muslim issues, which is traditional in Muslim sermons. The prayer included that the people asked Allah to correct the circumstances of Muslims, and in using this call, al-Baghdadi equates the declaration of a caliphate to correcting the miserable situation of Muslims. Al-Baghdadi used a brilliant lyricism to achieve this task, which demonstrated his religious background and strengthened his position as a virtuous and renewed religious man. Thereby again, he suggested he only wants to support the completion of the mission and unite the states of Muslims.

Emotional appeals can have powerful effects on message targets. These emotional appeals are sometimes used in terrorist propaganda; research on terrorist messaging suggests that terrorist actors primarily seek to arouse four emotions: fear, anger, guilt, and pride (Braddock, 2020). For example, al-Baghdadi was proud of the mujahideen's achievements in a crushing victory and declared the caliphate state when stating,

As for your mujahideen brothers, Allah has bestowed upon them the grace of victory and conquest, and enabled them, after many years of jihad, patience, and fighting the enemies of Allah, and granted them success and empowered them to achieve their goal. Therefore, they hastened to declare the Caliphate and place an imam, and this is a duty upon the Muslims (Al Baghdadi, 2014).

In this passage, al-Baghdadi used a strategy of emphasizing pride and strength by implying that jihad is a duty for every Muslim. He called for participation in this sacred Islamic duty to establish the Caliphate or the Islamic Empire:

This is a duty upon the Muslims - a duty that has been lost for centuries and absent from the reality of the world and so many Muslims were ignorant of it. The Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it, and they have done so, and all praise is due to Allah (Al Baghdadi, 2014).

Al-Baghdadi's choice of his first appearance at the mosque and Friday prayers is closely linked to his ethos as a religious man trying to establish a religious state with values distant from corruption. He only mentioned other Arab regimes by insinuation and did not directly criticize them. He was interested in the political gains that could be made from the speech than specific criticisms that might lead to reform within existing states. The speech consisted of many

appeals to Muslims, including emotional appeals by calling for doing good and acting obediently. As he declared the so-called caliphate, he credited his jihad and his followers for the many years of persistence needed to reach the goal and pledged to apply the sword of justice to everyone in the new state, all while promoting self-image. To make clear the message in his speech, he made a public appearance to declare a caliphate. When making emotional appeals, such as calling for jihad and supporting the new state established by ISIS, al-Baghdadi projected pride in his achievements. His message also focused on inciting jihad using evidence from the Qur'an and the words of the Prophet Muhammad, which came in different previous contexts.

In this speech, al-Baghdadi sought to enact a role model of Islamic identity and emphasized the restoration of dignity for the Islamic nation to persuade the audience. In his rhetoric about Ramadan, al-Baghdadi referred to the religious symbolism of the month of Ramadan. He wanted to invoke the symbols of Ramadan for the listeners because these are cultural symbols unique to Muslims. In this way, al-Baghdadi tried to create unity with the listeners. According to Cheney (1983), creating a unity with the audience is an essential element of creating common ground, such that he can draw on the shared beliefs and perceptions that strengthen his discourse for the audience.

Consistent with Aristotle's canons, the speech did not invent anything new; it was a classical religious discourse. As in classical Islamic discourse, he began by praising God and the Prophet Muhammad and doing the same. The construction of the speech was logical as he began a religious sermon by announcing the establishment of a caliphate under his leadership. He also suggested he had great honesty in as much as he did not desire to carry out these tasks but felt called by God to do so. He emphasized the virtues of jihad and the need to support the caliphate state. By concluding the speech with praise to God, the overall structure of the speech maintained the mood he intended to create in a strict and precise method. The arguments were logical and supported by evidence from the Qur'an and the words of the Prophet Muhammad. He read from a sheet of paper, and although he was gazing at the crowd during the speech, he was careful not to depart from the written text to uphold his firmness in presenting the message. He raised his voice to create a sense of strength and influence; the tones of his voice changed at several stages of the speech, and he used meaningful gestures toward the audience as he mentioned the arguments meant to link jihad to the orders of Allah. Overall, the speech was surprisingly persuasive, given it was al-Baghdadi's first appearance in public. The speech propelled him as a catalyst for the masses, likely due to his religious eloquence and persuasive authority in-person.

### ***Research question summary:***

RQ1: What are the persuasive elements and arguments on which al-Baghdadi's rhetoric was based?

As a cleric, Al-Baghdadi incorporated into his speeches the emotional calls and slogans that mimic the religious appeals and invitations as used in the Qur'an. These calls and slogans were intended to give more power and influence to his rhetoric. This intention was evident in all his speeches; for example, he used phrases such as "O Muslims worshipers of God, the youth of Islam, brothers of Islam, the mujahideen, and you who believe." He used plural forms in his speeches, often used in rhetorical practice by extremist Muslims such as Osama bin Laden. Clear speech, and speaking in the plural form of Islamic discourses is a classic approach that has been imitated in all religious discourses up to the current day. For example, in the first speech, Al-Baghdadi stated,

All praise is due to Allah. We thank him and seek His assistance and His forgiveness. O Allah, defend us from the evil of ourselves and the evils of our actions. Whoever is guided by Allah will never be misguided, and whoever is made lost by Allah will never be guided (Al Baghdadi, 2014).

Al-Baghdadi's essential focus was on building credibility as a cleric, preacher, and expert in complex Islamic teachings. He emphasized virtuous morals by invoking verses and Hadiths that encourage virtues, such as fasting, jihad, charity, as well as raising slogans in defense of weaker Muslims, reviving the Islamic caliphate, and restoring the dignity of Muslims. From the Arab and Islamic world's social perspectives, presenting the impression of religiosity and honesty is crucial to creating legitimacy for the speaker, thus facilitating the persuasion process. In some situations, Al-Baghdadi directly appealed to the people regarding the necessity of establishing an Islamic state and Islamic law as the framework for this state. Al-Baghdadi used these types of slogans since the establishment of his jihad movement. For example, in the first speech, he proclaimed,

O people, the religion of Allah, blessed be He, is not established and this goal for which Allah created us is not achieved but by empowering the Shariah of Allah and being judged by it and establishing the restrictions, and this is only done with power and authority." This is the establishment of the religion: A Book that guides and a sword that supports. (Al Baghdadi, 2014)

Al-Baghdadi also used Islamic cultural symbols, such as the sword, which is a symbol of strength and a reminder of the past glories of Muslims during the era of the Islamic empire. These are compelling messages for Muslims that are not easy to ignore.

In the first speech, Al-Baghdadi focused on building a credible personality among Muslims. He portrayed himself as a cleric who did not want the presidency and described the country he founded as different from the Arab

regimes. Al-Baghdadi stressed that he was chosen for the role by ordinary Muslims and not as a self-imposed leader. Al-Baghdadi considered leading the state to be a difficult task that must be accomplished for Muslims' sake.

Al-Baghdadi was also keen to raise the slogans of social justice and anti-corruption by reminding all that he was an average man chosen by others to rule, fight corruption, achieve social justice, and a fair distribution of wealth. His calls were linked to Islamic law, specifically to the return to the old Islamic system from the days of the Prophet Muhammad. The promises and appeals were effective because he linked them to the Qur'an. The usefulness of the appeals was especially apparent after chaos struck the Middle East, and the Arab system failed. Through slogans, virtuous expressions, and displays of Islamic morals, Al-Baghdadi presented an alternative for creating a successful Islamic empire that could last for centuries.

In the remaining three speeches dominated by the conflict between the international coalition forces and the Isis organization, Al-Baghdadi focused on slogans.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

*Social media and extreme persuasion.* Al-Baghdadi realized that his extremist religious ideology is not welcome on traditional media, and to confront this problem, he relied heavily on publishing his activities on social media, and he succeeded in reaching a wider audience by translating his religious ideas and speeches into several languages around the world. Incredibly, no speech was given on television or radio channels; instead, al-Baghdadi relied on social media, and in an unparalleled way, he spread the speeches and ideas around the world. In the process, the group established a news agency and a magazine interested in spreading Baghdadi's ideas. Al-Baghdadi succeeded in recruiting thousands of young people worldwide, and his messages reached 110 countries, as cited by the U.S. counterterrorism envoy. As the following grew, ISIS stepped up its propaganda campaign in an unprecedented way. Publicity campaigns varied using video and audio recordings and quick messages. ISIS's propaganda campaigns included mass executions, suicide bombings, and sniper operations for ISIS enemies. However, Isis was keen to highlight its soft image by publishing promotional videos that included celebrations with children on holidays, distributing financial and cash subsidies to low-income families, treating patients, and opening new schools. All these campaigns included images of the leader of Isis and audio excerpts from his famous sermon. They also established government headquarters under old Islamic names (Revkin, 2016). Social media has therefore been a crucial element in spreading the extremist al-Baghdadi movement, which is still active today despite his death in 2019.

The first video produced in high quality was entitled "Islamic State News." The report was a message to strengthen ISIS's position on social media;

the report was translated into English to target non-Arabic-speaking Muslims (Berger, 2015). Members of the ISIS of different nationalities began publishing tweets promoting ISIS's image on the social networking site, Twitter, under the title "Mujahid Diary." The Russian, German, and French languages were also frequently used on the accounts of ISIS members, which meant expanding the publicity process and using sophisticated techniques to recruit more fighters (Nico, 2014). Religious ideology was not the only motivating factor in the speeches. Al-Baghdadi has also promised a stable and robust country by fighting corruption, giving free health care, free education, and other benefits that attracted thousands of young people worldwide.

Many Western countries, including the United States, have acknowledged the failure of their efforts to counter the Isis campaign on social networking sites. Because of ISIS' expansion of social networking sites such as Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram, Western and Arab governments have struggled but failed to repel these campaigns (Berger & Morgan, 2015).

Twitter monitored more than 90 thousand accounts sympathetic to the ISIS organization. According to the website, 120,000 accounts were suspended on their website sympathizing with ISIS. One of the reasons for the failure of the counter-campaign is that Isis used several languages to spread his professional propaganda (Berger & Morgan, 2016).

ISIS's propaganda targets a dedicated group of young people both in the Arab regions and in western countries. ISIS's organization in its rhetoric focuses on young people in general, but it targets the rebellious young man who is angry about Society, who has lost his identity and feels isolated.

The conclusions of the study emphasize that Al-Baghdadi exploited the misery of the youth, their thirst for a new social order, and the desire to build an economically and militarily strong Islamic empire. In his speeches, al-Baghdadi blended emotional and religious appeals and verses of the Qur'an, conferring religious legitimacy on his state. These appeals mainly motivated religious youth in Islamic countries. Religious and extremist groups focus on persuading youths regarding factors common within their groups, thus, stimulating social identity by emphasizing the divide between us and them. More precisely, social identities can play a decisive role in wars, conflicts, and spark protest movements, as we see today, such as the Black Lives Matter movement that focuses on the injustice toward the Black race. The ISIS organization succeeded in operating schools and hospitals, restoring electricity and services in the areas it controls, thus, creating a free and straightforward social system for people, unlike other systems. Extremist Islamic movements are no longer against societies, but can administer the sites they control and provide free services to the communities. Social media contributed to sparking protest movements around the world. Al-Baghdadi's movement relied on social media to communicate his ideas to a wide range of Muslims—and even non-Muslims--worldwide.



It is also important to find a strategy that prevents terrorist and extremist organizations from accessing social media and using them to spread their malicious ideas. The Security Council must find a just solution to the five-decade-old Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the Sunni and Shiite extremist organizations use the Palestinian cause as a symbol of injustice to remind Muslims of the failure of political solutions and the lack of seriousness of the West in resolving Muslim issues.

## References:

- Abel, E. (1993). Black writing, white reading: Race and the politics of feminist interpretation. *Critical Inquiry*, 19(3), 470-498.
- Abouzeid, R. (2014). The jihad next door. *Politico*. June 23.
- Al Baghdadi (2014, July 1). Al-Baghdadi with the "caliphate" speech Arabic. CNN website. July/1. <https://arabic.cnn.com/amhtml/middleeast/2014/07/01/baghdadi-speech-isis>
- Allendorfer, W. H., & Herring, S. C. (2015). *ISIS Vs. The U.S. Government: A War of Online Video Propaganda*. *First Monday*, 20(12). <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v20i12.6336>.
- Berger, J. M., & Morgan, J. (2015). The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter. *The Brookings project on US relations with the Islamic world*, 3(20), 4-1.
- Bennett L & Segerberg A (2012) The logic of connective action. *Information, Communication, & Society*, 15(5), 739-768.
- Birke, S. (2013). How al-Qaeda Changed the Syrian War. *New York Review of Books* 27. (12/27)
- Borrowman, S. (2008). The Islamization of Rhetoric: Ibn Rushd and the Reintroduction of Aristotle into Medieval Europe. *Rhetoric Review*, 27(4), 341-360.
- Browne, R. (2018). *ISIS remains a regional and global threat despite battlefield losses, Pentagon says*. CNN News 8/16.
- Braddock, K. (2020). *Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization*. Cambr-+
- Braddock, K. (2020). *Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization*. Cambr-+
- Burghardt, C. R. (2005). Readings in rhetorical criticism. State College.
- Cheney, G. (1983). The rhetoric of identification and the study of organizational communication. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 69, 143-158.
- Clark, C. (2007). Aristotle and Averroes: The influences of Aristotle's Arabic commentator upon Western European and Arabic rhetoric. *The Review of Communication*, 7(4), 369-387.
- Colliander, J., & Dahlén, M. (2011). Following the fashionable friend: The power of social media: Weighing publicity effectiveness of blogs versus online magazines. *Journal of Advertising Research*, 51(1), 313-320.
- Della Porta, D., & Mattoni, A. (2015). Social movements. *The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication*, 1-8. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc010>
- Ezzaher, L. E. (2015). Three Arabic Treatises on Aristotle's Rhetoric: The Commentaries of al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. SIU Press.
- Foss, S. (2004). *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice* (3rd Ed). Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press.



- Georges, A. (2016). ISIS rhetoric for the creation of the Ummah. In *Religion and theology: breakthroughs in research and practice* (pp. 429-449). IGI Global.
- Hendrix, J. A. (1968). In defense of neo-Aristotelian rhetorical criticism. *Western Speech*, 32(4), 246-252. doi:10.1080/10570316809389579
- Holbrook, D. (2010). Using the Qur'an to justify terrorist violence: analysing selective application of the Qur'an in English-Language militant Islamist discourse
- Hoffman, B. (Ed.) (1999). *Inside terrorism* (pp. 89-97). Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0231126991.
- Heath, R. L., & Bryant, J. (2013). Human communication theory and research: Concepts, contexts, and challenges. Routledge
- Institute for Economics and Peace. (2016). *Global terrorism index*. <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>.
- Jackson, R. (2007). Constructing enemies: Islamic terrorism in political and academic discourse. *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), 394-426. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x. ISSN 0017-257X.
- Kavada, A. (2016). Social movements and political agency in the digital age: A communication approach. *Media and Communication*, 4(4), 8-12.
- Khan, S. (2014). Another battle with Islam's 'true believers.' *The Globe and Mail*. September 29, 2014.
- Knights, M. (2014). The ISIL's stand in the Ramadi-Falluja corridor. Combating Terrorism Center. *Politics*, 3(5), 9-12. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Knights20140529-CTCSentinel.pdf>
- Lee, A. (2020). Youth, Media Activism, and Communication Counterpower: A Comparative Study.
- Liang, C. S. (2015). Cyber Jihad: Understanding and countering Islamic State propaganda. Geneva Security Center for Policy. *Policy Paper*, 2(4), 6. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f418/f8ba0c8ba539c1f10ea6551fdc92fd20334b.pdf>
- Malinick, T. E., Tindall, D. B., & Diani, M. (2013). Network centrality and social movement media coverage: A two-mode network analytic approach. *Social Networks*, 35(2), 148-158.
- Moore, J. (2015). *The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview* [Television series]. PBS Frontline. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html>.
- Oinas-Kukkonen, H., & Harjumaa, M. (2009). Persuasive systems design: Key issues, process model, and system features. *Communications of the Association for Information Systems*, 24(1), 28.
- O'Shea, J (2016). ISIS: The Role of Ideology and Eschatology in the Islamic State: *The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs*. Fall 2016 • Volume I, Issue 2 | 51
- Peters, P. (2007). Gaining compliance through non-verbal communication. *Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal*, 7, 87
- Tollefson, M. (2017). Rhetoric, Aristotle: pathos. In M. Allen (Ed.). *The Sage encyclopedia of communication research methods* (Vol. 3, pp. 1483-1483). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc doi: 10.4135/9781483381411.n521
- Tracy, T. (2017, Aug. 17). ISIS remains deadliest terrorist organization in the world, reports say. *The Daily News*. <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/isis-remains-deadliest-terrorist-organization-world-report-article-1.3429745>.
- Urbanski, S. (2016). A neo-Aristotelian critique of “Jimmy’s World”: New ideas in a long-debated journalism fabrication. *American Communication Journal*, 18.
- Wood, G. (2015). What ISIS really wants. *The Atlantic*, 315(2), 78-94.



Zhu, Q. (2017). Citizen-Driven International Networks and Globalization of Social Movements on Twitter. *Social Science Computer Review*, 35(1), 68–83.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439315617263>